Robert J More
V Case No. 03 C 2941
Cook County State’s Attorney (“CCSA”)Richard Devine, Asst. CCSA L. Callaghan, CCSA Office, Chicago Police Department, Cook County Sheriff’s Office, any Law Enforcement Entity the CCSA Would Use to Apprehend and Arrest Robert J. More (“RJM”), Cook County Circuit Court Judges Ralph Reyna, & Colleen Sheehan, All Cook County Circuit Court Judges, Cook County Public Defender Rita Fry, Cook County Asst. Public Defenders R. Campbell, F.Ptatek, R. Morrissey, Any Defendants Included Below That Ought Be Named In This Complaint:
City of Chicago, Chicago Police Department, Terrence Hilliard Superintendent of Police for City of Chicago, Chicago Police Officers (“CPO”’s) Marto, Hammond, Detective J. Adams, Detective Glenn Dvorsky, Sgt. Keane, Sgt. DeYoung, Lieutenant Dahlburg, Lt. J. Doe, Watch Commander J. Doe, Asst. Supts J. Doe, & J. Doe, CPO’s J. Doe, & J.Doe, CPO John Gholar, CPO Huerta, CPO Male, Municipality of Cook County, Cook County State’s Attorney R. Devine, Asst. Cook County State’s Attorney (“ACCSA”s ) Jennifer Sheck, J. Doe, K Swanson, B. King, Mr. Gebhart, other J. & J. Does, Cook County Circuit Court Judge (“CCCCJ”)W. Williams, CCCCJ Edward Antonietti, Cook County Clerk (“CCC”)Dorothy Brown, Assistant CCC’s J. Doe & J. Doe, Illinois Appellate Court Judge (“IACJ”)Shelvin Louise Marie Hall, IACJ J. Doe, IACJ J. Doe, Cook County Sheriff’s Office, Cook County Sheriff (“CCS”) M. Sheahan, CCS Deputy McReynolds, Illinois State Senator J. Cullerton, Attorney (“Att”). F. Babbitt, Att. R. Bruen, All Partners of Fagel & Haber Law Firm, Cook County Psychiatrist, Dr. R. Salzburg, with all Defendants Sued Both in their Official & Individual Personal Capacities & the Municipal & Other Governmental Entities Sued as Government Entities
VERIFIED COMPLAINT INCLUDING PETITION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER IN THE PRAYER FOR RELIEF CONTAINED IN THE COMPLAINT ITSELF
Jurisdiction – This Court possessed jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 28 USC 2201& 2202 as well as upon all bases included infra.
Factual Background Since 9/19/02.
Shortly after that complaint (No. 02 C 6736) was filed, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit Judge D. Wood issued a sanction upon RJM for filing what was claimed by her to constitute a frivolous motion in Appeal No. 01-3224. Regardless of the fact that there was absolutely nothing in any document RJM ever filed in that Court in that case, nor for that matter, that RJM has ever filed in any court in any case, which actually could justifiably have been classified as frivolous according to the actually applicable standard defining the term frivolous which definition is as follows:
paraphrase from Journal of Appellate Practice and Procedure 2001, p. 159 - A claim for relief is “legally frivolous” only if is “squarely foreclosed by statute, rule, or authoritative court decision, or is lacking any factual basis in the record of the case.”(Barefoot v Estelle, 386 U.S. 738, 894) The Court stated that an issue is nonfrivolous if that issue is “debatable among jurists of reason” or put another way, if “a court could resolve the issue [in a different manner].” In that article the definition of the term “frivolous” is further explicated, which definition will later be provided to a measure of specificity that completely precludes the labeling of any paper RJM has ever filed as “frivolous”. The point here is that nothing in any paper submitted in that case or in any other case in which RJM has ever been involved was frivolous according to the Supreme Court’s established definition of the term, as the relief RJM was in the matter then at issue before the
Appellate Court – namely to obtain some form or other of relief with which to prevent his adversary in the matters which eventually resulted in that appeal from changing their position after the reading of what would have constituted RJM’s arguments to the Appellate Court, to the prejudice of RJM, which is obviously just a matter involving the matter of judicial estoppel – was a form of relief granted to attorneys every day of the year in this country.
RJM explained to Judge Wood that in good faith he could not pay the monetary sanction imposed upon him, as there was no justification in law or morality which was ever presented to him which would have justified his paying it and the Court did not even attempt to justify the imposition of it, even upon petition from RJM that it do so.
The Court then issued an order preventing RJM from filing any paper in any court under the authority of the Seventh Circuit C.A. for two years or until RJM paid the sanction. Written into that order was an exception for any matter that involved a criminal prosecution of RJM.
The whole matter of the presumptively unjustified utilization of the label “frivolous” has been appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court in a petition for a writ of certiorari No. 02-9971, a copy of which will be presented to the Court in the future if such would be requested.
Judge Marovich then dismissed the civil rights complaint (No. 02 C 6736) in which some of the many abuses and crimes committed against RJM and the public which RJM had chronicled and to which reference has been made herein supra, were enumerated . Criminal telephone harassment on Circuit Court of Cook County Complaint No. 01118828901 which was and is the underlying criminal prosecution charge which gives rise to this complaint, is the underlying charge in regard to which the State possesses not a shred of evidence that there is any message ever left by RJM which was not left for a legitimate purpose and according to a legitimate method proportionate and commensurate with the accomplishment of a legitimate objective which RJM was ever in a given scenario obliged to endeavor to accomplish. In other words, RJM could not possibly lose the underlying claim in regard to which he herein seeks a TRO, unless more crimes would be committed in the adjudication of this matter.
In November of 2002, RJM endeavored to accomplish the objectives he had to accomplish to bring the criminal case to trial in the Trial Court and filed several motions to accomplish that objective. Judge C. Sheehan refused to remove the public defender from the representation of RJM which resulted in Sheehan’s never having to answer any of RJM’s questions nor to address any of the issues RJM was then raising in preparation for trial. RJM explained that he could not see how Sheehan could conduct her activity according to the points of reference, priorities and methods according to which such activity was being conducted without incurring criminal liability upon among other grounds 18 USC P.1., Ch. 1503, 241, 242, 3, 4, 1951, 1961 et seq and 2381.
Judge Sheehan then ordered that RJM be subjected to another Behavioral Clinic Exam (“BCX”) after he had already been examined against his objection thereto in April of 2001.
RJM attended the BCX exam on 1/2/03. The same doctor who had “examined” him on 4/1/01 and declared him fit for trial now :re-examined” RJM and now declared him unfit for trial. Shortly, RJM will present to the Court long articles on the politics of the DSM manual the psychiatric profession in general demonstrating how dangerous and damage-causing an entity both are.
On or about 1/22/03, RJM appeared in Courtroom 504 at the Cook County Criminal Courts Building at 2650 S. California St. in Chicago, IL, before Judge R. Reyna and explained in some detail RJM’s claim that the only disposition of the affair before the Court at that juncture that would not result in the incurrment to the Judge and Prosecutor of criminal liability would be a dismissal of the case and moved for a dismissal of the case at that juncture or that the Court provide a justification for not immediately dismissing the case. Numerous matters were raised by RJM at this hearing.
The matters were entered and continued to 2/20/03 which was the 45th day from the day upon which the Trial Court had received the report on the BCX exam. According to 725 ILCS 5/104-16: “ .. the Court shall conduct a hearing to determine the issue of the defendant’s fitness within 45 days of the receipt of the final written report of the person or persons conducting the examination …. subject to continuances allowed pursuant to Section 114-4 of this Act.”
In this case none of the conditions that would have had to have been present for the Court to grant a continuance pursuant to 725ILCS 5/114-4© were present. Nonetheless, Judge Reyna in egregious contravention of numerous provisions of Title 18 USC including 1503 and several others, granted a continuance anyway, even after he had committed the Court to the position that the fitness exam would be held on 2/20/03.
Reyna also appointed the public defender to the case against RJM’s will thus committing another crime in that there was no legal basis for his doing so and notified RJM that he would “lock you [RJM] up, if you [RJM] say [said] one word.”
A new fitness hearing date was set for 3/21/03.
RJM contacted the Public Defender’s Office to complain of the nonexistent “assistance of counsel” that the Asst. P.D. was providing/not providing. RJM also repeatedly contacted the Asst. CCSA Callaghan to complain that she had never provided the documents the Court had ordered her to provide on 1/22/03, which RJM needed in order to prepare for the fitness hearing.
RJM filed more documents with the Court including a lengthy (about 50 paragraph motion to dismiss and for other forms of consideration). Besides serving them on the Asst. CCSA, RJM served these on Head CCSA R. Devine at his office, explaining that RJM needed a confirmation that Devine would receive what was being served so that he would not later succeed in claiming he was not cognizant of the substance of the claims RJM was making against him personally and against his subordinates.
At the hearing on 3/21/03, the Psychiatrist did not appear, upon the conveyance of the pretext that she was ill that day.
Reyna prevented RJM from speaking at all, notifying RJM that he would be “locked up”
if he spoke. There were several grounds upon which the Court was obliged to then and there dismiss the charges.
Rather than dismissing the case which was all the Judge possessed the authority to do at this time pursuant to the applicable laws, as the State obviously had not made it a high enough priority to complete the fitness exam with the statutorily established time limit, he arrogated in contravention of 18 USC 1503 et al the authority to provide notice that RJM was required to submit to a third BCX exam on 3/25/03.
RJM went to serve a copy of a motion on the Clerk but Reyna prevented him from doing so.
The Deputy Sheriff said RJM had to wait for recess
Sgt Buckner later told RJM that a recess is in effect whenever the Judge leaves the bench.
When the Judge left bench, RJM approached clerk and a female deputy yelled (Sansone, Venturelli) at him not to approach the clerk.
Later, a male deputy sheriff notified RJM at 11:25 a.m. that if Reyna saw RJM in courtroom he would order such deputy to lock RJM up. RJM reminded the deputy that courts are supposed to be open to the public.
These incidents demonstrate in a slight measure the malice and criminality that has pervaded the proceedings to which RJM has been subjected in this textbook example of what A. Rand asserted:
"We are fast approaching the stage of the ultimate inversion: the stage where the government is free to do anything it pleases, while the citizens may act only by permission; which is the stage of the darkest periods of human history, the stage of rule by brute force." [Ayn Rand, The Nature of Government].
At the BCX exam conducted on 3/25/03, RJM presented to Dr.Salzburg a copy of the civil rights complaint No. 02C6736, in which she was listed as a defendant. RJM knew that if RJM did not complain to Salzburg regarding the methods she had employed in injurying RJM unjustifiably in the prior two exams, and did not implement the measures necessary to prevent her from further unjustifiably injuring RJM in the subject examination, that it could later be claimed by Salzburg that RJM had acquiesed, impliedly consented, affirmed, neglected to prevent and/or mitigate damages caused and that thus RJM would stand to lose some of his damages if he did not insist that the exam be conducted in such manner that RJM would not be injured or at least such that the proceedings would be recorded for posterity via one means or another. RJM, realizing that the damages in a lawsuit are property (Logan v Zimmerman Brush Co _U.S. _______), also notified Salzburg that in some instances, he would have to demand that Salzburg establish foundations for her questions and discontinue the practice of not permitting RJM to adequately answer questions and the practice of mischaracterizing RJM’s answers. Salzburg then curtailed the proceedings.
On 4/9/03, RJM spoke to an Asst. CCSA A. Samuels regarding allegations that had been made that RJM was subject to an involuntary admission to a “mental health” facility. Since RJM had also been apprised that individuals in the CCSA Office had claimed that RJM had threatened R. Devine, RJM had to get to the bottom of whatever lies, fabrications and character assasinations had been made against RJM by his enemies in that office.
Cognizant of the long record of malefactions and crimes that is the record of the CCSA Office, RJM was, at the time, preparing to petition for a temporary restraining order to prevent the CCSA Office from kidnapping RJM and involuntarily admitting him to such a facility. RJM was notified by Samuels on or about 4/9/03 that Samuels saw no such need for such measure.
On 4/15/03, RJM was apprehended by Chicago Police Officers upon an egregiously deficient and in fact criminal Petition for Involuntary Admission that had been as RJM understands the matter, presented by the Office of the CCSA to a judge, and taken against his will and over the objections that a felony was being committed by these officers and everyone responsible for such development, in apprehending him, to the Madden Mental Health Facility in Hines IL.
It took the service of 26 documents, two court appearances, 2 radio interviews, including one nationally syndicated one, and howsoever many phone calls to the Administration of the MMHF to get RJM freed from the political imprisonment to which he had been subjected.
It was found that RJM demonstrated absolutely no indication that he posed a serious threat of physical harm to himself or others or that he could not take care of himself.
On 4/24/03 RJM returned to his domicile and since then has been trying to obtain answers from the CCSA Office as to what representatives of that office did that resulted in the serious unjustified injury to RJM of his being detained in that facility for nine days.
RJM has been totally preoccupied with undoing the damage that has been done to him by the activity of the CCSA Office. For example, representatives of that office have since 4/24/03 signed false names on documents RJM has served upon the office and have endeavored to force him to leave a public building in a situation in which the party who attempted to accomplish such objective possessed no authority to act as he did. RJM is still being damaged by the duty breaches, offenses, abuses, crimes and torts committed by the CCSA Office. At present a chronicling of the whole ugly affair of the violence and criminality that the CCSA Office has perpetrated in collusion with individuals representing the law firm of State Senator J. Cullerton and several Cook County Judges is being added bit by bit to the Chapter 38, “The Story of the Attempted Lynching…..” in the website of the DNRCPN at http://www.geocities.com/thirstforjustice.
Given the past track record of Judge Reyna and the CCSA Office, RJM has to expect nothing but more violence and criminal activity from them and thus finds that he now has no evident choice except to preempt the activity of those entities by obtaining a TRO until he can obtain a preliminary and then permanent injunction, enjoining the prosecution of this case. Without such order, RJM could be subject to any number of abuses, including being held in contempt of court and being then held for 180 days without any opportunity to be freed. Since the implementation of such type measure could work an irreparable injury on RJM in that the legal affairs to which he is obliged to attend might not be salvageable or could only be salvaged at a precipitous cost to RJM for which he would never succeed in obtaining full remedy and since it is forseeable that RJM could suffer an injury in the Cook County Jail – given the malice of his enemies and the condition of that jail for which monetary damages could not adequately compensate him, RJM finds that he has been left without a choice except to seek a TRO at this juncture. The past activity of the CCSA Office and Cook County Judges has already left RJM with a stigma that it will be difficult if not impossible for RJM to ever shed.
It is well established that bad faith state criminal prosecutions can be enjoined by a federal court (Wilson v Thompson, (5th Cir. 1979)) notwithstanding the implications of Younger (Gibson v Berryhill (1973)).
Given that in this case, RJM stands to suffer irreparable harm from the denial of the petition for the TRO, that it would be impossible to adequately remedy RJM for the harm of his being killed or disabled in the jail which could happen in this case, were the Court to find him in contempt or otherswise find a pretext by which to incarcerate him & that the possible loss of the legal contentions and claims which RJM would stand to suffer could be unremediable given the complexity of the issues involved, that there is no practical possibility that the State could prevail upon the merits of the original charge, as it is meritless, and that on procedural grounds the charges should have been dismissed long ago, that the State cannot identify any harm to it in the Court’s granting this petition for a TRO, subject to further petitions to have the whole prosecution enjoined, none of the conditions which would have to be present for a Court to deny this petition for a TRO as part of a larger complaint are present in this case.
RJM has not included citations to cases re threshold level at which a Court must consider these matters as he presumes judges know the law and because of time constraints not imputable to any fault of RJM
RJM again opines that it is impossible in an adequately structured and regulated court proceeding that RJM would not win the underlying case.
RJM incorporates by way of reference all factual averments contained from the complaint filed in regard to these matters earlier here:
Robert More (“RJM”) herein asserts the following claims against various defendants in the above-entitled action:
-for civil damages:
(1) violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983: initial unjustified, constitutionally impermissible & criminal (federal felonies in contravention of 18 USC 241, 1503, 1951, 1961 et seq. 2381), interference (“UCI&CI”)with RJM’s claims to participate in the ordinary activities of life without incurring unjustified interference from any entity, either public or private by representatives of the Chicago Police Department (Hammond, Marto, Keane, DeYoung, Dvorsky, Adams et al) in form of warrantless & illegal search of RJM’s living quarters in December of 2000.
(2) – in form of illegal seizure of RJM’s person,
(3) –in form of false imprisonment for 27 hours at Chicago Police Department without there ever having existed any probable cause that a crime had been committed by RJM
(4) –in form of battery via use of handcuffs
(5) –in form of utilization of excessive force to effect imprisonment & arrest via use of handcuffs
(6) – in form of non-provision/deliberate, repeated, reinforced, & pertinacious denial of - opportunity for RJM to produce evidence demonstrating his complete innocence in regard to the crime he was charged with in the initial detainment in direct & contumacious disregard of the standard articulated in Illinois v Gates 460 U.S. 213
(7) – in form of denial of access to the restroom in the police station
(8) –in form of subjection to humiliation & interference with mental tranquility by not one, but two CPO’s
(9) – in form of denial while in lock-up of anything to eat except one bagel with cheese for a period of 24 hours
(10) common law tort of constructive defamation against CPO’s Hammond, Marto, et al
(11) common law tort of malicious prosecution against F. Babbitt, R. Bruen, J. Cullerton, All Partners at Fagel & Haber Law Firm & the Law Firm itself
(12) violation of 42 USC 1983 deprivation of liberty & property rights under color of law against Cook County, the CCSA, R. Devine, ACCSA, Jennifer Sheck, J. Doe, both in their ministerial & administrative capacities
(13) violation of 42 USC 1983 deprivation of liberty & property rights under color of law against Cook County Circuit Court Judge W. Williams, in preventing RJM from speaking in Court, using deputy sheriffs in an attempt to intimidate RJM, in not addressing issues appropriately raised by RJM, in preventing RJM from superimposing the structure on the proceedings conducted in the Court in order to accomplish the identifiable ends of justice, & in sending RJM to a BCX exam without there having been any justification for the implementation of such measure
(14) violation of 42 USC 1983 by Dr. Salzburg in conducting BCX
(15) violation of 42 USC 1983 deprivation of liberty & property rights under color of law against Cook County Municipality, CC Sheriff M. Sheahan & CCS Deputy McREynolds in forcing RJM to depart from a public courthouse at 14:00 on a Friday Afternoon in the First Quarter of 2001.
(16) violation of 42 USC 1985(3): conspiracy on the basis of invidious discrimination against a member of a class, RJM being the sole Cook County resident in regard to whose existence Resident RJM is cognizant who accepts all that the Non-counterfeit Catholic Church teaches & refuses to conduct activity according to the prevailing pagan standard in this God-forsaken society, which is to appease & accommodate those presumed to be able by their conduct to benefit or harm one’s interests; instead, conducting his activity always on the protective side of the protective/predatory fault line
(17) violation of 42 USC by CCCC Clerk J. Doe who falsified court records
violations of 42 USC 1985(2) – unjustified interference with court proceedings & processes &/or interference with right of access to court systems (ie. conspiracy for purpose of impeding , hindering , obstructing… the due course of justice in any State …with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws, (Bell v Milwaukee 498 F.Supp.1339, Crawford 386 F.Supp. 187).
(18) RICO predicate act violations of obstruction of justice, interference with interstate commerce on grounds enmerated in pars included supra.
(19) violation of 42 USC 1983 deprivation of liberty & property rights under color of law against Asst. CCSA Karin Swanson for disobeying a court order in regard to the submission of documents to RJM
(20) violation of 42 USC 1983 by Swanson & associate B. King in neglecting to conduct adequate inquiry into the issue of probable cause in this case
(21) violation of 42 USC 1983 by CCCC Judge E. Antonietti in utilizing an entirely subjective standard in regard to intelligibility of documents submitted by RJM, in refusing to consider documents submitted by RJM & in refusing to hold Swanson in contempt of court or have her arrested for the felonies she committed against RJM & the public
(22) on information & belief, violation of 42 USC 1983 by CPO John Gholar & CPD for nonproduction of documents in response to a subpeona appropriately issued
(23) violation of 42 USC 1983 by Appellate Judge Shelvin … Hall & her associates in denying RJM copies of court transcripts & also denying the declaring of his version of the facts that would be established therefrom for purposes of the appeal [to be the official version] & then dismissing the appeal
(24) violation of 42 USC 1985(2) on grounds enumerated in pars. #’s 20 – 23
(25) RICO predicate act violations of obstruction of justice, interference with interstate commerce on grounds enumerated in pars. # 20 – 23 supra.
(26) violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983: refusing or neglecting a.) to prevent the initial constitutionally impermissible & felonious deprivation of RJM’s rights & b.) to later respond so as ameliorate the damage consequently caused by the deprivation
(27) common law tort of malicious abuse of process,
(28) common law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress imputable to all actors enumerated,
-for injunctive relief - prevention of retainment in government employment of any of the parties eventually found to have incurred liability in any of the causes enumerated supra,
(29) declaration of unconstitutionality of any weapons concealment banning laws as applied to RJM
(30) declaration of unconstitutionality of any laws imposing criminal liability on grounds of resisting arrest or fleeing & eluding arrest as applied to RJM
(31) declaration of unconstitutionality of any hiring increases & or compensation increases for any of the entities included supra, unless & until substantial efforts to restore order to the conducting of the activities of such entities is accomplished
(32) injunctions from a.) punishment to RJM for ever defending himself in an incarceration setting from any attack that might ever, whether orchestrated or otherwise, be perpetrated upon him, b.) from being prevented from wearing some type of groin protection device in such type setting c.) from having to sleep in the presence of more than one other person total in a given enclosement, & d.) from exposure to smoke.
1. Jurisdiction of this court is invoked under ; 28 U.S.C. 1331, 1337, 1343, and 1367(a); 42 U.S.C 1983, 1985 & 1988; and 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968.
2. Jurisdiction of this court for the pendent claims is authorized by F.R.Civ.P. 18(a), and arises under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction as set forth in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
11. The Plaintiff sues all public employees in their official and individual capacities.
due process of & the equal protection of - the laws, besides his right to petition the government for the redress of grievances, conducting her activity on the “having it both ways” double standard, one way street, sacred cow – absolute discretion that so many tens of millions of Americans have by now come to expect from judges, government officials & corporate officers as the customary modus operandi of this evidently all but hopelessly unsalveagably corrupted country.
(Clerk of Courts), that employees can conspire with own corporation United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, that [a] government entity make(sic) [may] constitute [an] “enterprise” within meaning of R.I.C.O. United States v. Freeman, 6 F.3d 586, that an enterprise may include courts. United States v Angelilli, 660 F.2d 23; U.S.v Bacheler, 611 F.2d 443, & that a city can be an enterprise. United States v Logue, 751 F.Supp. 748, 755 (N.D. of Ill): & that there are more than the two or more related acts necessary to state a claim on the RICO count, the RICO count must necessarily be recognized by this Court.
Each of the claims contained in this complaint will be explicated to a much greater measure at a later date.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands in the larger suit of which the request for a TRO, then a preliminary injunction and then a permanent injunction, is included herein; judgment against all the Government Agent Defendants jointly and severally, for actual, general, special, compensatory damages in the amount of $140,000 and further demands judgment against each of said Defendants, jointly and severally, for punitive damages in the amount of $100,000, plus the costs of this action, including attorney's fees, and such other relief deemed to be just and equitable, on the 42 USC 1983 Counts, for the same damages on the 42 USC 1985 (2) count, & the same damages on the 42 USC 1985 (3) count, & for appropriate compensatory damages equaling the same amount on the RICO count[,] plus treble damages: & from the Corporate Attorney Defendants, RJM demands judgment on compensatory damages of $140,000.00 from each, plus punitive damages in the aggregate of one million dollars, plus the costs of this action, including attorney's fees, and such other relief deemed to be just and equitable, plus appropriate compensatory damages equaling the same amount on the RICO count[,] plus treble damages on the RICO count.
Furthermore, RJM moves this Court to issue injunctions preventing any law enforcement officer or anyone else from charging or otherwise punishing RJM with any charge of resisting arrest, fleeing & eluding arrest, for carrying a concealed weapon, or for defending himself in an incarceration setting from any attack that might ever, whether orchestrated or otherwise, be perpetrated upon him, & from being prevented from wearing some type of groin protection device in such type setting & from having to ever sleep in the presence of more than one other person or to be exposed to second hand smoke.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands in the request for a TRO, then a preliminary injunction and then a permanent injunction against the CCSA Office, Judge R.R Reyna and all Cook County Circuit Court Judges, against the Chicago Police Dept. the Cook County Sheriff’s Office and any and every other law enforcement entity; that pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 65(b) without the giving of notice thereof to defendant or its attorney, restraining and enjoining any and all representative(s) of the CCSA Office, Judge R.R Reyna and all Cook County Circuit Court Judges, against the Chicago Police Dept. the Cook County Sheriff’s Office and any and every other law enforcement entity and all those in active concert with them from participating in any activity involving Robert J More regarding Criminal Case No. 01118828901, which would result in anything other than the immediate dismissal of such case, pending a hearing and determination of plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiff further moves this Court for an order setting a date for such hearing.
Unless the relief sought in this petition for a TRO is granted, plaintiff will suffer immediate and irreparable loss, damage or injury as a result of actions of defendant(s), (since the next hearing date set for this case in the state court is 5/2/03 at 9:00 a.m.), before defendants or its attorney can be heard in opposition to this petition (complaint) and before a hearing had on the _______________as has been explained supra and will be further explained as soon as RJM can further explicate his concerns. Notice could not be accomplished on the defendants beyond the emailing of this document which was accomplished on 5/1/03. RJM also seeks an injunction preventing any more unmonitored BCX exams or court proceedings in Cook County, as the stenographers do not adequately record the events occurring in courts. He also seeks herein an order enabling him to immediately obtain copies of all of the transcripts prepared from every hearing held in this case, and an order in which is contained a directive requiring the Building Management Office of 69 W. Washington St. Chicago to require Officers Foster and Frazier to complete the accompanying statements regarding the events which occurred on 4/29/03 at 10:00 a.m. in their presence. RJM also seeks permission to initiate discovery in the matters involving the injunction and a ruling that there will be a bifurcation of claims for purposes of postponing discovery in regard to every matter not involving the injunctions herein sought
Plaintiff respectfully demands a jury trial in this case.
The undersigned states that I am the Plaintiff herein, and have read the foregoing pleading filed [by me] on my behalf , and that I aver under penalty of perjury that the facts stated therein are true.
May 1, 2003 _____________________________
Robert J. More
2008 S.Blue Island, Chicago, IL 60608, 312 455-8385 (add all tickets & tows)
Robert J More
V Case No.
Cook County State’s Attorney (“CCSA”)Richard Devine, et al.
PROPOSED TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
The Court has considered the verified complaint submitted by Robert J. More with a petition for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) contained therein, against Cook County State’s Attorney R. Devine and all named defendants, pending the hearing and determination of the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction herein; the verified complaint containing explanation of the irreparable injury RJM stands to incur if the TRO is not granted, and RJM’s claims re the provision of notice to the CCSA of the petition for this TRO having been duly noted.
Because it appears on the basis of the claims presented by the plaintiff herein that all conditions that would have to be present for a court to grant a TRO in circumstances such as are present in this case, are in fact present in this case (and/or that according to the same factual predicates, that there would be no basis upon which a court could justify denying such a petition for a TRO) and that the plaintiff would suffer immediate and irreparable harm, loss and/or injury before notice can/could be more fully given and defendants could be heard in opposition to such order, and in that the leaving of RJM subject to even more abuse, duty breaches, offenses and/or crimes which might be committed if RJM is not provided the TRO immediately enjoining any of the defendants from acting so as to disrupt the presently existing status quo in these matters (ie RJM’s freedom from artificial or other than normal restraint and/or confinement) which would result in the harms and damages enumerated in the body of the accompanying complaint before a hearing can be had on the complaint including the petition for a TRO and the Court is of the opinion that the TRO should be issued.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. R. Devine and/or the CCSA Office, Judge R.R Reyna and all Cook County Circuit Court Judges, the Chicago Police Dept. the Cook County Sheriff’s Office and any and every other law enforcement entity; are restrained and enjoined pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 65(b) from participating in any activity involving Robert J More regarding Criminal Case No. 01118828901, which would result in anything other than the immediate dismissal of such case, pending a hearing and determination of plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction.
2. Plaintiff further moves this Court for an order setting a date for such hearing, which will be held on _________-, at ___________________.
3. It is also ordered that all BCX exams given in Cook County be monitored and that all proceedings in Cook County Courts likewise be monitored, as the stenographers do not adequately record the events occurring in courts.
4. RJM is also herein granted an order enabling him to immediately obtain copies of all of the transcripts prepared from every hearing held in this case,
5. The Circuit Court Clerk of Cook County and the Official Court Reporters are ordered to provide to RJM copies of all transcripts prepared from any and every proceeding in which RJM has participated in these matters and to immediately prepare these if they have not yet been prepared._____________
6. The Building Management Office of 69 W. Washington St. Chicago is hereby required to require that Officers Foster and Frazier complete the accompanying statements regarding the events which occurred on 4/29/03 at 10:00 a.m. in their presence.
7. It is hereby ordered that RJM is granted permission to initiate discovery in the matters involving the injunction___________________.
8. It is hereby ordered that there will be a bifurcation of claims for purposes of postponing discovery in regard to every matter not involving the injunctions herein sought.
9. It is hereby ordered that if this petition for a TRO has been found for whatever reason to be inadequate, that the petition will not be denied with prejudice, but that it would only be denied without prejudice and/or that leave would be provided for the plaintiff to refile the petition; and/or for that matter, the complaint, should it be found that the complaint is in some way inadequate
May 1, 2003 _____________________________